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INTERNATIONAL CUSTOMARY LAW AND 
ARTICULATION THEORIES:  
AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS* 
 
Vincy Fon** 
Francesco Parisi***  
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
While there are those who know much about the creation of 
societal norms of behavior, there is much that is unknown. 
Significant work remains to obtain a full understanding of how 
such behavioral regularities emerge. This article contributes to the 
field of custom formation by modeling the process of customary 
law formation under different legal doctrines and regimes. Such 
modeling is particularly important considering the fact that legal 
scholars have recently criticized the traditional explanations of 
customary law as being tautological, non-descriptive of actual 
practice, and unable to provide meaningful normative guidance in 
the adjudication of customary rules. Most recently, Goldsmith and 
Posner (1999, 2000) have critiqued traditional customary law 
theories and suggested that customary rules emerge out of a 
coincidence of interest rather than a sense of legal obligation.1  
This article begins by considering the extent to which the 
coincidence of the states’ normative interest is sufficient to yield 
efficient rules of customary law. In modeling the formation of 
customary rules, the authors pay close attention to the timing of a 
 
 
* This article builds upon research in the George Mason University Working 
Paper Series by the same authors (Fon and Parisi 2002). 
** Associate Professor, George Washington University, Department of 
Economics. E-mail: yfon@gwu.edu. 
*** Professor of Law & Director, Law and Economics Program, George Mason 
University, School of Law and Distinguished Professor of Law and Economics, 
University of Milan. E-mail: parisi@gmu.edu. The authors would like to thank 
Anthony D’Amato, Robert Cooter, and the participants to the 13th Annual Conference 
of the American Law & Economics Association, and the Workshops in Law and 
Economics at the New York University, Economics Department, University of 
California at Berkeley, School of Law, University of Amsterdam, Economics 
Department, and University of Hamburg Graduate College, for valuable comments on 
an earlier draft. 
1 Goldsmith and Posner (1999, 2000) question theories of international law that 
base custom on some sense of exogenous obligation by the states. 
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state’s articulation of its beliefs and the timing of its action. This 
article builds upon the findings of D’Amato (1971, forthcoming) 
and Parisi (1998), extending the analysis to consider new theories 
of customary law formation, with special emphasis on the role of 
articulation.2  
Under traditional customary international law theory, a tenet of 
international law becomes a viable norm only when (1) the tenet is 
widespread in practice and (2) it is rational for each individual 
member of the relevant international community to follow the tenet 
at each point in time. In contrast to this traditional theory, this 
article offers an extension of existing articulation theory that allows 
states’ articulations to anticipate the element of practice, thus 
letting international state actors signal how they might wish the 
norm to develop before any specific incidence of conflict occurs. 
States fulfill the articulation component by making 
“announcements” of their intentions: announcements that they may 
make through formal unilateral statements as well as through 
bilateral or multilateral informal understandings. 
This article shows that while customary norms are often 
capable of supporting cooperative behavior by participating states, 
outcomes resulting from reliance on traditional customary norms 
may systematically fall short of what might be obtainable through 
articulated norms. The key reason for this shortcoming is that 
customary norms necessarily require a “first mover” to begin the 
custom; however, such custom-initiating actions will only take 
place in a context where the action is necessary. In such settings, 
state actors’ preferences (and resulting actions) are inherently 
biased by the immediacy of the situation, and thus any custom that 
begins is unlikely the best outcome.  
In contrast, an articulation norm can commence in the 
abstract—outside the context of an imminent emergency. The 
 
 
2 According to these theories, in the process of ascertaining the existence and 
content of customary rules, the states’ statements and expressions of belief are 
relevant. D’Amato (1971, forthcoming) considers articulation as a formative element 
of international customary law. In D’Amato, this element operates in conjunction with 
state practice and abstention. This article utilizes D’Amato’s concept of articulation, 
but pushes this notion beyond its originally intended scope. The model of articulation 
processes that this article develops allows states to express their consensus over 
potential rules prior or concurrent to the time of their action through practice. When 
articulation occurs before any customary practice, articulation can replace actual 
action and by itself generate a rule of customary law. In both cases, custom emerges 
when states undertake an action that is consistent with their expression of normative 
views contained in their prior or concurrent articulations.  
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acting states are thus separated from the type of role-specific 
context that often clouds and biases customary norm formation. 
Consequently, articulated norms are much more likely to produce 
outcomes that are closer to ideal. Moreover, norms resulting from 
articulation are more likely to satisfy states’ participation 
constraints at any given time than are customary norms. The 
economic model explained below corroborates these results and 
suggests that a norm’s strength depends on environmental 
parameters with predictable effects. These parameters include 
discount rates, the costs of custom compliance relative to the 
benefits obtained when other states comply with the custom, the 
number of participants, time delays, and uncertainty. Since 
customary norms tend to depend more crucially on these 
parameters, they are much harder to support than articulated norms. 
The structure of this article is as follows. Part II will present the 
traditional doctrines of customary law, which provide the legal 
framework for customary law formation. Part III will model the 
traditional custom-formation process for the case of bilateral 
custom and will extend the bilateral custom model to multilateral 
custom cases. This Part will focus specifically on situations 
involving uncertainty and delay in the formation and recognition of 
an emerging custom and how such situations affect states’ 
participation and effort incentives. Participation and effort 
incentives are instrumental in identifying the limits of the 
traditional customary processes in real-life conditions. Part IV will 
revisit these limits by examining the potential role of alternative 
doctrines and processes of customary law formation in mitigating 
the shortcomings of traditional customary law theory. This Part will 
introduce a variation in the custom-formation process by which 
states express consensus over emerging rules of custom before 
actually establishing customary practice through action. Part IV 
will also model the custom formation process under these 
alternative doctrines and will identify the respective limits and 
advantages of the alternative frameworks of custom formation in 
different environmental settings.  
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II. THE FORMATION OF CUSTOMARY LAW3 
 
Relatively few principles govern the formation of customary 
law. The theory of customary law defines custom as a practice that 
emerges outside of legal constraints, which individuals and 
organizations spontaneously follow in the course of their 
interactions out of a sense of legal obligation.4 Over time, two or 
more individual actors embrace norms that they view as requisite to 
their collective welfare. According to traditional theories, an 
enforceable custom emerges from two formative elements: (a) a 
quantitative element consisting of a general or emerging practice; 
and (b) a qualitative element reflected in the belief that the norm 
generates a desired social outcome. 
 
A. The Quantitative Element 
 
The quantitative requirement for customary law formation 
concerns both the length of time and the universality of the 
emerging practice. With respect to the time requirement, there is no 
universal minimum time duration required for the emergence of 
customary rules. Customary rules have evolved from both 
immemorial practice and single acts (Tunkin 1961). Nevertheless, 
French jurisprudence traditionally requires the passage of forty 
years for the emergence of an international custom. Similarly, 
German doctrine usually requires thirty years for an international 
custom to form (D’Amato, 1971, 57). Naturally, the longer the 
formative stage of a custom, the less likely it is that the custom 
effectively provides a viable substitute for formal law or treaty 
agreements or adapts to changing circumstances over time. 
International legal theory is ambivalent regarding the condition 
of universality. Charney (1986) suggests that the system of 
international relations is analogous to a world of individuals in the 
state of nature thereby dismissing the idea that unanimous consent 
by all participants is required before binding customary law is 
formed. Well-accepted restatements of international law require 
consistency and generality—not universality—for custom 
 
 
3 Part II builds upon research presented at the American Political Science 
Convention by Francesco Parisi (2000). 
4 For example, see Article 38(1)(b) of the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice, and Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States,    
§ 102(1). 
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formation (D’Amato 1971; Brownlie 1990). Recent international 
law cases restate the universality requirement in terms of a norm 
experiencing increasing and widespread acceptance. Notably, these 
cases allow special consideration for emerging general norms and 
local clusters of spontaneous default rules that should become 
widespread over time. However, where fluctuations in behavior 
render it impossible to identify a general practice, the consistency 
requirement is not met.  
Furthermore, with regard to rules at the national or local level, 
the varying pace at which social norms transform suggests that 
there is no way to establish a general time or consistency 
requirement as an across-the-board condition for the validity of a 
custom. The stochastic origin of social norms anticipates some 
variance in individual observations of practice. A flexible time 
requirement is particularly necessary in situations of rapid flux 
where exogenous changes are likely to affect the incentive structure 
of the underlying relationship. 
The findings of this article shed light on the appropriate design 
of customary processes and provide guidance in adjudicating 
customary rules with respect to both issues of timing and 
consistency of application.  
 
B. The Qualitative Element  
 
The phrase opinio iuris ac necessitatis, which describes a 
widespread belief in the desirability of a practice and the general 
conviction that the practice represents an essential norm of social 
conduct, generally identifies the second formative element of a 
customary rule. This element often finds definition in terms of 
necessary and obligatory convention (Kelsen 1939, 1945; D’Amato 
1971; Walden 1977).  
The traditional formulation of opinio iuris ac necessitatis is 
problematic because of its circularity—it is quite difficult to 
conceptualize that law can be born from a practice that most 
already believe to be required by law. The traditional requirement 
that participant states must believe in the normative principle 
embedded in the emerging practice (opinio iuris) may have arisen 
in response to game inefficiencies as a belief of social obligation to 
support behavioral rules that avoid aggregate losses from strategic 
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behavior.5 This article considers Goldsmith and Posner’s (1999 and 
2000) critique of opinio iuris, according to which rules of 
customary law emerge out of a coincidence of interest rather than a 
sense of legal obligation. It builds on Goldsmith and Posner’s 
insightful critique in an attempt to verify the extent to which 
coincidence of states’ normative interest may be sufficient to yield 
efficient rules of customary law.  
 
III. A MODEL OF CUSTOMARY LAW FORMATION 
 
Customary rules emerge from past practice. Prior to the 
consolidation of a practice into a binding custom, states engage in 
actions on a purely voluntary basis.6 Two main factors influence an 
individual actor’s choice to engage in a given action: (a) the 
immediate costs and benefits of the action (i.e., circumstantial 
interest); and (b) the interest that the actor may have for the future 
in establishing a binding customary rule (i.e., normative interest). 
The distinguishing characteristic between an emerging custom and 
a mere usage is that emerging customs include the belief that the 
current practice may lead to a binding customary rule. Such 
normative expectations contribute to and influence states’ actions.  
The relative importance of circumstantial and normative 
interests in influencing states’ actions varies with specific 
situations. In some cases, circumstantial interest is of decisive 
importance—for example, states may engage in a specific action to 
satisfy their immediate interests, regardless of their expectations 
that the action may generate a binding rule for the future. In other 
cases, normative interest dominates, as when states engage in a 
certain activity in order to establish a binding custom that will 
govern future interactions.7 
 
 
5 The practical significance of this requirement is that it narrows the range of 
enforceable customs—only those practices recognized as socially desirable or 
necessary would eventually ripen into enforceable customary law. Once there is a 
consensus that group members ought to conform to a given rule of conduct, a legal 
custom can emerge when some level of spontaneous compliance with the rule is 
manifest. As a result, observable equilibriums that are regarded by society as either 
undesirable (e.g., a prisoner’s dilemma or an uncooperative outcome) or unnecessary 
(e.g., a common practice of greeting neighbors cordially) will lack the qualitative 
element of legal obligation, and therefore will not generate enforceable legal rules. 
6 Notably, customs are not all formed voluntarily; Goldsmith and Posner (2000) 
discuss the use of coercion by a powerful state to impose rules of international law. 
7 The authors make no claims with respect to the long-term stability of the rule 
that emerges. In fact, the analysis is perfectly consistent with that of Goldsmith and 
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While in some situations the motives behind states’ action may 
converge, in other cases, possible tension exists between states’ 
circumstantial and normative interests.8 In the presence of such a 
conflict, the customary law formation process poses a cooperation 
problem. This article investigates the process of customary law 
formation in situations resulting from conflict between states’ 
circumstantial and normative interests. In order to effectuate this 
analysis, this article makes certain assumptions, including the 
assumption that at each moment in time the circumstantial interest 
of one state is in conflict with the commonly shared normative 
interests of the other states. More specifically, this article considers 
the case of customary practices that create costs for one state while 
generating benefits for others, such that the total benefits exceed 
the total costs incurred by the participant states and the customary 
practice is therefore socially desirable. The social net payoff is the 
sum of costs and benefits for all states. Well-accepted economic 
analysis demonstrates that states determine the socially optimal 
effort level by equating social marginal cost and marginal benefit.9 
The following section of this article considers the extent to which 
customary law processes are capable of approaching a social 
optimum. Initially, this article’s analysis addresses bilateral 
practices and subsequently extends the analysis to multilateral 
practices. 
In practice, states are often faced with voluntary participation 
problems in the absence of existing customs. Such problems occur, 
in part, because voluntary participation in a new practice can 
impose costs on one state while conferring benefits on another. The 
following hypothetical situation illustrates this problem. Two states 
exist; the first state faces an emergency and the second state faces 
                                                                                                          
Posner (1999, 2000), who argue that the behavioral regularity will disappear if the 
normative interests of the nations change. This article, however, allows for the rule to 
have some short-term binding effects that constrain states from departing from 
accepted rules in pursuit of their circumstantial short-term interests. 
8 In some instances, following a given practice would satisfy both the 
circumstantial and the normative interests of the states. In other words, participation 
may be Pareto superior at each time period and all states would benefit from 
compliance with the custom during each time period. In these instances, following the 
emerging custom would always be a dominant strategy for all states. Consequently, 
such practices would become self-enforcing since no state would ever face a 
temptation to depart from them. Thus, the recognition and enforcement of such 
practices as rules of customary law would be unnecessary. These practices fall outside 
the scope of the present analysis since they would not pose strategic compliance 
problems.  
9 Appendix A1.1 demonstrates this principle. 
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the decision of whether to voluntarily rescue the first. Assuming 
that the marginal cost of the rescue activity is lower than the 
benefit, the cost-benefit analysis would render the rescue socially 
desirable. However, in the initial time period, if the second state 
were to undertake a rescue, it would bear a cost while the first state 
would receive a benefit. These immediate costs and benefits are the 
states’ circumstantial interests.  
Notably, the circumstantial interests of the two states have 
different signs. The rescuer’s circumstantial interest is negative 
(i.e., the rescuing state expects to face a cost), while the rescued 
state’s circumstantial interest is positive (i.e., the rescued state 
expects a benefit from being rescued). In this example, the choice 
of action (whether the rescue will occur) is in the hands of the 
rescuer, while the rescued state is a passive recipient of the benefit. 
Thus, when evaluating whether to undertake a rescue activity, it is 
sufficient to consider only the participation and incentives of the 
rescuer—the state that faces negative circumstantial interests.10  
The analysis continues by assuming that the states will engage 
in repeat interactions. After the initial time period, the states’ 
alternate and future roles (as rescuers or rescued) will be decided 
solely on a probabilistic basis. In each subsequent period, there is a 
probability that a given state will be the beneficiary of other state’s 
activities (the probability of being rescued). On the other hand, 
there is also a probability that the state will continue to be on the 
giving side (the probability of again being the rescuer).  
One possible outcome of the above-mentioned hypothetical is 
that the states follow socially desirable practices, subject to 
reciprocity. Here, reciprocity extends both to the participation in 
the emerging practice and to the quality or effort level of the 
reciprocating conduct. This outcome provides clarity in identifying 
the extent to which the acting state’s normative interest may lead to 
action and customary practice; it assumes that the state can expect 
reciprocity at whatever effort level chosen by that state when it in 
turn needs rescuing.11 These premises facilitate analysis regarding 
the extent to which the acting state’s circumstantial and normative 
 
 
10 In the more general case of customary practice, this analysis implies assuming 
away situations in which the initiators of the customary practice can create a benefit 
for themselves, regardless of the other states’ participation and reciprocal compliance.  
11 For a more general model of reciprocity in cooperation problems, see Fon and 
Parisi (2003).  
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interests may lead to action and participation in the emerging 
customary practice.  
In the above-mentioned example, a state would need to have its 
participation constraint satisfied for it to be willing to participate in 
the rescue venture.12 For example, in the case of multilateral custom 
formation, not every individual state becomes actively involved or 
passively involved in the custom-generating practice. At any given 
time, a positive number of non-participants observe other states’ 
activities without participating. These non-participating states may 
seem like acquiescing spectators of an emerging custom. 
 
A. Increasing the Number of Potential Participants to  
Custom Formation 
 
When the number of potential participants increases, the 
probability of a state’s involvement decreases. The decrease in the 
probability of involvement leads to a decrease in the optimal effort 
level expended by the state. Likewise, as more participants become 
involved, it becomes harder to satisfy the participation constraint, 
making it less likely that individual states will take part in the 
formation of a customary practice. Both results have relation to the 
fact that the choice of initial participation imposes a present and 
sure cost on participating states, while the probability of future 
benefit-producing involvement with the emerging custom may 
decrease with the number of participants. 
These results are consistent with the empirical findings of 
sociologists and anthropologists who have found that close-knit 
environments with small communities of participants provide the 
most fertile environments for the emergence of efficient customs 
(Ulmann-Margalit 1977; Parisi 1998; Ellickson 2001). Moreover, 
these results support Goldsmith and Posner’s (1999, 2000) 
skepticism about invoking reciprocity to explain international 
cooperation in cases involving more than two states. Finally, these 
results have important implications for the adjudication of 
customary norms. For example, some could argue that courts 
should give great attention and enforcement to customs established 
in small or close-knit communities given the efficiency with which 
customary rules emerge in such environments. Likewise, local, 
regional, and special customs should enjoy at least as much 
 
 
12 Appendix A1.2 shows the formulation of the optimization problem faced by 
the initial rescuer. 
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recognition, if not more, than general and widespread customary 
practices.  
 
B. Introducing Uncertainty in the Formation of Custom 
 
Thus far, the custom formation model has assumed that later 
participants to the custom always follow the initial practice with 
reciprocal behavior. This assumption has allowed the effects of 
strategic participation and effort choices of the states to be isolated 
from the effects of uncertainty regarding the future participation 
and compliance of other states. In real-life settings, however, initial 
participants to a customary practice have no guarantee that their 
action will actually lead to the formation of a binding custom. 
Thus, a state’s initial effort may not always meet with reciprocity, 
which may undermine the motivation of the initial action and 
frustrate the expectation of reciprocal behavior from others. 
Returning to the hypothetical rescue example, if the potential 
rescuer state has no assurance that its effort will meet with like 
behavior when fortunes reverse, this lack of assurance may 
compromise its incentives to offer voluntary rescue. 
This section considers the conditions under which optimal 
practices emerge when the initial participant states have no 
assurance that others will reciprocate their practices. This analysis 
requires an extension of the previous model to include the 
possibility of uncertainty in custom formation. This model assumes 
a probability that other states will follow the practice originally 
undertaken by the state in question.13 For example, in the case of 
multilateral custom formation, not every individual state engages 
actively or passively in the custom-generating practice. At any 
given time, a positive number of non-participants observe other 
states’ activities without participating. These non-participating 
states can be seen as acquiescing spectators of an emerging custom. 
 
C. Introducing Time Lags in the Formation and 
Recognition of Custom 
 
Finally, the analysis of traditional custom formation processes 
extends to consider the effects of time lags on the process of 
emergence and recognition of custom. Time lags and delays in the 
consolidation or recognition of a custom affect the time in which 
 
 
13 Appendix A1.3 shows this variant of the model. 
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the initial participants are able to capture the benefit of the custom 
they initiated. Delays can occur for numerous reasons. For 
example, customs involving events of rare occurrence (e.g., a 
rescue in outer space or on the high seas) may result in custom 
formation delays. Similarly, delays can occur because of legal 
system norms; some legal systems require a long-standing practice 
of twenty or thirty years before the usage is recognized and 
enforced as a binding customary rule. 
The longer the delay in the formation process or recognition of 
the custom, the lower will be the effort level rationally exerted by 
the initial participants. As shown in A1.3.2 in the Appendix, the 
presence of delays and time lags in the formation of the custom also 
affects the participation constraint. This implies that some practices 
that would have successfully evolved in the absence of delays and 
lags might fail to develop if delays or lags occur. 
In sum, when states have a positive time preference and 
unaligned circumstantial and normative interests, delays in the 
formation and recognition customs may produce negative 
participation and incentive effects. The above-mentioned results 
further suggest that custom-related settings that entail infrequent 
state actions should require a lower number of observations, and 
thus a shorter waiting period, before the practice may consolidate 
as a binding rule. Otherwise, given the infrequency of action and 
delay in custom formation, states would heavily discount the 
benefits of future applications of the custom, and, as a result, would 
have less incentive to participate in custom development.  
 
IV. BELIEF AND ACTION IN CUSTOM FORMATION: THE RELEVANCE 
OF TIMING AND ARTICULATION 
 
Part III demonstrated that in situations where the circumstantial 
and normative interests of the states do not align, the following 
factors may have negative effects on the states’ participation and 
incentives: (a) increases in the number of participants; (b) 
uncertainty in the future development of the custom; and (c) delays 
in the formation and recognition of the custom. These findings have 
important implications for the assessment of alternative 
mechanisms of customary law formation. This Part uses these 
findings to investigate whether the adoption of alternative doctrines 
of customary law formation can mitigate the shortcomings of 
traditional customary law processes.  
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This Part proceeds by considering an important variation in the 
custom formation process called articulation theory. This 
theoretical variant of traditional customary law processes allows 
states to express their consensus over potential rules prior to 
establishing custom through practice. Accordingly, custom emerges 
when states undertake action consistent with the expression of a 
belief contained in their prior or concurrent articulations.14 This 
Part models the custom-formation process under such alternative 
doctrines and identifies the respective limits and advantages of 
these alternatives in different environments. 
 
A. Normative Interests and Circumstantial Interests in the 
Formation of Custom: The Role of Articulation 
 
Notable scholars have considered the conditions under which 
principles of justice can emerge spontaneously through the 
voluntary interaction and exchange of individual group members. 
As in a contractarian setting, the reality of customary law formation 
relies on a voluntary process through which community members 
voluntarily adhere to emerging behavioral standards and thus 
develop rules that govern their social interactions.15 As discussed 
above, this custom-formation process becomes problematic when 
the states have unaligned circumstantial and normative interests. 
Although some notable legal theorists and practitioners have 
considered the requirement of opinio iuris in addressing customary 
 
 
14 D’Amato (1971) allows for the alternative sequence of articulation occurring 
prior to or concurrently with the state act (practice). In D’Amato, however, not much 
emphasis is placed on the timing of practice and articulation for the understandable 
reason that international law treats the two elements as qualitatively different from 
each other (one is a physical act, the other is a human characterization). This treatment 
of practice and articulation renders any discussion of the temporal order between the 
two items mostly irrelevant under positive international law. 
15 In this setting, Harsanyi (1955) suggests that optimal social norms are those 
that would emerge through the interaction of individual actors in a social setting with 
impersonal preferences. The impersonality requirement for individual preferences is 
satisfied if the decision makers have an equal chance of finding themselves in any one 
of the initial social positions and they rationally choose a set of rules to maximize their 
expected welfare. Rawls (1971) employs Harsanyi’s model of stochastic ignorance in 
his theory of justice. However, the Rawlsian “veil of ignorance” introduces an element 
of risk aversion in the choice between alternative states of the world, thus altering the 
outcome achievable under Harsanyi’s original model with a bias toward equal 
distribution (i.e., with results that approximate the Nash criterion of social welfare). 
See Sen (1979); Ullmann-Margalit (1977); and Gauthier (1986) for further analysis of 
the spontaneous formation of norms and principles of morality. 
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law formation, many others have looked past the notion of opinio 
iuris and, instead, have concentrated on the elements of 
“articulation.”16 Articulation theories capture the following two 
important features of customary law: (a) customary law is voluntary 
in nature; and (b) customary law is dynamic. According to these 
theories, in the process of ascertaining the qualitative element of 
opinio iuris, the theorists and practitioners should attentively 
consider states’ statements and expressions of belief. Individuals 
and states articulate desirable norms in order to signal that they 
intend to follow and to be bound by such norms. Thus, articulation 
theories remove the guessing process from the identification of 
opinio iuris and allow the manifestation of expressions of belief 
before or in conjunction with customary action.  
Consider, for example, a hypothetical scenario in which 
articulation determines the content of emerging customary norms. 
In this context, articulation may be a way for states to pre-commit 
to the content and interpretation of an emerging international 
custom. Subsequent consolidation and custom enforcement would 
remain contingent upon the development of states’ future practices, 
but articulation would facilitate the coordination between states 
with respect to the emerging practice. Further, articulation can 
represent a way for states to recognize an emerging norm of 
international law even in the absence of concurrent state practice.17  
 
 
16 In attempting to solve one of the problems associated with the notion of opinio 
iuris, namely the troublesome problem of circularity, legal scholars, most notably 
D’Amato (1971), have considered the crucial issue of timing of belief and action in the 
formation of customary rules. The traditional approach emphasizes the awkward 
notion that individuals must believe that a practice is already law before it can become 
law. This approach basically requires the existence of a mistake for the emergence of a 
custom: the belief that the law required an undertaken practice, when instead, it did 
not. Obviously, this approach has its flaws. Placing such reliance on systematic 
mistakes, the theory fails to explain how customary rules can emerge and evolve over 
time in cases where individuals have full knowledge of the state of the law. 
17 This formulation of the notion of articulation obviously encompasses different 
possible factual scenarios, not all of which would find a readily applicable treatment 
under positive international law. Under current law, the element of articulation is not 
sufficient in itself to constitute custom. If separated from practice, articulation 
processes would render custom formation similar to an informal legislative process, 
given the possibility for generating new rules of international law via the meeting of 
minds of state actors. This informal legislative process would be difficult to implement 
in a multilateral setting since it would potentially impose excessive costs on third party 
states in the monitoring and objection to states’ articulations. But see Military and 
Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27). Nevertheless, this 
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Consistent with the predicament of the economic models, 
articulation theories suggest that states should give greater weight 
to beliefs expressed before the emergence of a conflict.18 When 
states face a tension between their circumstantial and normative 
interests, this would imply that states should give relevance to 
statements of belief (i.e., articulations) expressed by the states, 
even when articulations lack actual practice.  
Before the contingent circumstances of the matter are known, 
states articulate rules consistent with their ex ante normative 
interests. They have incentives to articulate and endorse rules that 
maximize their expected welfare. This rule may not necessarily 
correspond to the ex post circumstantial interest of the states in a 
specific case and may fail to maximize their actual payoff when 
roles and circumstances are unveiled to the states. Thus, timing of 
relevant action is important to both participation and effort 
incentives. To illustrate the point, it is useful to consider again the 
working example of mutual rescue. Given some degree of 
uncertainty as to the future course of events, the states’ normative 
interests easily align. A rule of mutual rescue clearly maximizes the 
expected welfare of the international community at large. 
Therefore, if asked in abstract as to whether their society should 
bind itself by a norm of mutual rescue, states would likely agree to 
bind themselves.  
As previously seen in Part III, this type of mutual agreement 
may not necessarily occur under traditional processes of customary 
law formation. When individuals and states have the opportunity to 
manifest their beliefs only through action, their participation and 
incentive constraints may undermine their action. At the time of 
action, states have biased strategic incentives, which may fail to 
induce states’ optimal participation under the circumstances. More 
generally, states will usually articulate rules that best fulfill their 
current circumstantial interests and welfare rather than the 
normative interest and expected welfare derived from an uncertain 
future. The aforementioned rescue example illustrates this 
principle. In the example, if those in need of rescue require too 
much effort, those called to provide the rescue may undersupply it. 
Thus, in the absence of previously accepted standards of conduct, 
                                                                                                          
pronouncement of the International Court of Justice has been readily criticized by 
D’Amato (1987, 101). 
18 Here, it is interesting to point out a strong similarity between the legal and 
economic models. Articulations that states make prior to the unveiling of conflicting 
contingencies can analogize to rules chosen under a Harsanyian veil of uncertainty. 
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states will likely withhold or undersupply mutual assistance. In 
such a situation, if adjudicators were asked to choose between the 
behavioral standards articulated ex ante and standards advocated ex 
post by the states, they would favor the adoption and enforcement 
of the ex ante standards of conduct. 
 
B. Custom Formation with Prior Articulation  
of the Content of the Norm 
 
The analysis of this section builds upon the predictions of the 
previous section and considers the incentive properties of 
customary law processes that rely on ex ante articulations. First, 
this section explores a setting similar to that considered in Part III; 
however, it assumes that states have an opportunity to articulate the 
content of what they perceive to be a desirable norm before actively 
engaging in the customary practice.19 During the initial period, the 
states specify a rule by means of articulation. In terms of the rescue 
example, the assumption is that participant states express their 
beliefs on the norm of rescue before their respective roles are 
unveiled. However, the future horizon for the states is unchanged. 
The probability π represents that states will benefit from the 
articulated rule, and the probability 1 - π represents the likelihood 
that the rule will burden the state. This problem can thus be 
compared to the basic customary law problem considered 
previously. In this problem, a state’s objective of current 
maximization has one less negative term since the endorsement of a 
hypothetical rule by means of articulation requires no practice or 
effort expenditure. 
Articulation processes allow states to pursue their normative 
interests while avoiding any potential conflict with their 
circumstantial interests. In the traditional customary law case, the 
expected payoff from participation had to be greater than the 
opportunity cost of participating in the customary practice in order 
to satisfy the participation constraint. In the case of articulation, 
states also compare participation constraints against the opportunity 
costs. Notably, in the case of articulation, the participation 
constraint is less likely to be satisfied when it is more costly to 
undertake the activity or when the state’s discount rates are higher, 
as shown in A2.1.1 of the Appendix. However, states are more 
 
 
19 Appendix A2.1 shows formulation of the optimization problem faced by a 
representative state. 
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likely to participate when the benefits from reciprocal cooperation 
or the probability of their benefiting from the custom in the future 
are higher. 
It is also important to determine the effort level that states will 
choose when participating in a custom. Careful analysis of states’ 
incentives reveals an important difference between traditional 
custom-formation and articulation processes. Under articulation 
theory, the states’ discount rates have no impact on optimal effort 
levels.20 However, as previously noted, even under articulation 
theory the discount rate has an impact on the participation 
constraint. The higher the discount rate, the less likely it is that the 
participation constraint will be satisfied, and, consequently, the less 
likely it is that the state will join the custom-generating articulation. 
Notably, even though higher discount rates may undermine 
participation, if the states choose to participate they will choose 
optimal effort levels and advocate optimal rules.  
The optimal outcomes resulting from articulation are a 
substantial improvement over the outcomes of traditional 
customary law processes. This improvement occurs because 
articulation processes, unlike traditional custom-formation 
processes, eliminate the incentives for states to understate their true 
normative interests by letting other states commit to a customary 
rule before their specific circumstantial interests are unveiled. 
A mathematical comparison of the privately and socially 
optimal effort level under an articulation model demonstrates that 
two effort levels can be identical only if the probability of being a 
beneficiary of the emerging rule is one half.21 This means that 
homogeneous states and unbiased role-reversibility are important 
prerequisites of custom-formation processes, even under 
articulation theories. Consequently, when probabilities distribute 
equitably, the privately optimal effort level equals the socially 
optimal effort level. This principle is also evident in the rescue 
example, which shows that when the probability of being rescued 
equals the probability of becoming a rescuer in the future, the states 
face incentives to articulate efficient rescue rules because the states 
will give equal weights to the expected costs and benefits of future 
rescue missions. However, this principle does not hold true when 
the states face asymmetric probabilities of being rescuers or 
victims. In cases of asymmetry, the private and social incentives 
 
 
20 See section A2.1.2 in the Appendix. 
21 See section A2.1.3 in the Appendix. 
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will diverge and the diverging interests of the states will affect their 
resulting articulations. 
In practice, lack of alignment between private and social 
incentives results because private individuals determine their 
optimal effort level by balancing the expected private marginal cost 
and benefits. Such optimal balancing takes into account the 
individual probabilities of receiving benefits and costs. On the 
other hand, in deriving a social optimum, states should not discount 
their marginal cost and benefits because of future probabilities. 
Instead, states should simply balance social marginal cost and 
marginal benefit without weighing social optimums since the ex 
post distribution of costs and burdens between the states is 
irrelevant. Consequently, the private optimum and the social 
optimum will only coincide when the probabilities are uniform for 
all players. 
 
C. Articulation and the New Boundaries of Customary Law 
 
This section considers different attributes of custom-formation 
processes and evaluates the ability of articulation processes to 
overcome the shortcomings of traditional customary processes 
identified in Part III. This section also extends the analysis 
regarding the relative effectiveness of the different formative 
processes in facilitating custom-formation by first comparing the 
effect of articulation processes on the participation constraint and 
then considering the impact on the states’ incentives.22 Thus, the 
modeling and comparison of the participation constraint under 
articulation theories and the participation constraint under 
traditional customary law results in a model that implies that the 
participation constraint is more easily satisfied in the articulation 
case than in the traditional customary law case. Therefore, it 
follows that allowing potential participants to announce their 
participation in the emerging custom and to articulate the effort 
level they consider appropriate, ex ante, facilitates the customary 
law formation. 
Similarly, states can engage in inquiries with respect to the 
content of the emerging custom, as symbolized by their chosen 
effort level. Under articulation theories, states do so by comparing 
the privately optimal effort that other states would advocate with 
 
 
22 See section A2.2 in the Appendix. 
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the privately optimal effort level that they would choose under 
customary law. The optimal effort that states would rationally 
choose under articulation is greater than the effort that those same 
states would choose under traditional customary law processes. 
States should also consider the workings of articulation 
processes in situations where a customary practice randomly draws 
the participants from a larger population. Additionally, states must 
assume that not every individual is actively or passively involved in 
the custom-generating practice.23 Instead, at each period, a positive 
number of non-participants observe others’ activities; the 
probability of being an active participant depends on the number of 
states involved as shown in the rescue illustration. The model 
assumes that the probability of a state being a participant in a 
rescue venture depends on the number of states available. It then 
compares the articulation results with those obtained in the case of 
traditional customary law, and an important difference becomes 
apparent. Under articulation, an increase in the number of 
participant states reduces the probability of a state’s involvement in 
the articulation process of the rescue rule. However, as pointed out 
in A2.3 in the Appendix, even though an increase in the number of 
states may render participation less likely, once participation 
occurs, the states will undertake optimal effort levels and advocate 
optimal rules. This is a substantial improvement over traditional 
customary law processes that, as seen above, produce less than 
optimal effort levels due to pervasive strategic problems in 
multilateral settings.  
Part III considered the conditions under which optimal practices 
would emerge, given uncertainty as to whether a binding rule of 
custom would evolve from the states’ initial efforts. Here, that 
analysis extends to consider the effects of uncertainty in the case of 
articulation processes. As in the customary law case, the analysis 
assumes that other participants will follow the practice in question 
with a probability β in the future. As shown in A2.3.1 in the 
Appendix, an increase in the probability of customary formation 
increases a state’s willingness to expend effort, and it has a positive 
impact on a state’s willingness to advocate customary norms by 
means of articulation. The probability of custom formation thus 
affects both participation and incentives under articulation. 
 
 
23 See section A2.3 in the Appendix. 
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Part III also observed that time lags and delays in custom 
recognition affect the time in which the initial participants are able 
to capture the custom’s benefit when roles reverse. That analysis 
found that lags and delays could undermine both the participation 
and the effort incentives in a traditional customary law case, thus 
rendering traditional customary law processes ineffective at 
regulating events of rare occurrence.  
Here, the analysis expands to consider the effects of time lags 
under articulation processes of custom-formation.24 If after 
articulation has taken place a period of time elapses before the 
articulated practice consolidates into a binding custom with 
expected reciprocal benefits, then the parties are less likely to 
actively engage in the articulated practice. Hence, the presence of 
time lags negatively affects the participation choice under both 
traditional and articulation theories of custom formation. The 
longer the delay before any enforcement of the articulated rule 
takes place, the less likely that the state will actively engage in the 
articulation process. However, as shown in A2.3.2 in the Appendix, 
such a delay likely has no impact on the qualitative standards 
advocated by the states and the resulting rules of custom.  
Notably, these results may originate from delays in rule 
implementation that decrease the discounted present value of the 
future payoff, thereby weakening the incentives for states to 
participate in the articulated venture. On the other hand, delays in 
future events do not alter the balance between expected benefit and 
expected cost in the future. Consequently, if states meet their 
participation constraints, there is no reason for them to alter their 
choices of optimal effort, no matter how long the delay. 
Additionally, articulation processes of custom formation improve 
upon the traditional processes with respect to states’ incentives and 
the resulting qualitative content of the emerging custom. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
In summary, both strengths and weaknesses are evident in the 
customary law formation processes. Customary law is, in many 
respects, an effective source of law that generates rules based on 
the revealed choices of participating states. Notably, some settings 
are more congenial than others to the evolution of customary rules. 
Notwithstanding the historical successes of traditional customary 
 
 
24 See section A2.3.2 in the Appendix. 
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law formation processes, some situations significantly undermine 
the effectiveness of traditional customary law. Such situations 
include: (a) increases in the number of participants, (b) uncertainty 
in the future development of the custom, and (c) delays in the 
formation and recognition of the custom. Each of these situations 
creates a negative effect on the states’ participation and incentives. 
These negative effects prompt an analysis of an alternative 
mechanism of custom formation, namely, articulation doctrine, 
which provides significant benefits over traditional theory. 
According to articulation doctrine, customs emerge when states 
formulate like-minded articulations before or in conjunction with 
customary practice. Most notable among the benefits of articulation 
theory is the greater ease with which customary rules emerge as a 
result of prior articulation. Likewise, articulation processes of 
custom formation always improve the effort incentives for 
participating states as compared to traditional processes. This 
improvement occurs notwithstanding the possibility of sub-optimal 
customs emerging in cases involving asymmetric probabilities. 
Another significant advantage of articulated norms over 
traditional customary law is that articulated norms allow states to 
form consensus on a given norm without having to wait until a 
sufficiently large number of states recognize actions as uniform 
practice. This decreases the time of formation for customary 
norms—a potentially sizeable benefit, especially when the 
frequency of participant states’ actions is intrinsically low. In fact, 
articulated norms provide some of the same benefits that treaty 
laws provide, including the formulation of rules before any instance 
of practical implementation. Consequently, articulation eliminates 
the first-mover problem that affects typical custom formation.  
As illustrated above, however, articulated norms do not always 
guarantee the best results. Both articulated norms and traditional 
customary law avoid the costly and difficult process of treaty 
negotiation and ratification; they both could also diverge from the 
ideal, even when the ideal is otherwise feasible. In contrast, in 
cases of treaty-created law, full-fledged bargaining between states 
can take place, and this may lead to ideal outcomes even when 
asymmetric state preferences are involved. In addition, as with 
traditional custom formation, delays and time lags can negatively 
affect states’ participation choices under articulation theories. 
Significantly, the longer the delay before enforcement of the 
articulated rule, the less likely that the state will actively engage in 
the articulation process. Nevertheless, notwithstanding their effect 
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on states’ participation, delays and lags have no negative impact on 
the qualitative standards advocated by the states and the resulting 
rules of custom. 
Another shortcoming of the articulation approach is the risk of 
poor coordination among participant states, especially during the 
initial stage of norm articulation. For example, if states make 
inconsistent initial articulations, this may compromise subsequent 
coordination between the states and, as a result, no clear norm will 
emerge. Traditional customary law, by looking at actual practice, 
avoids such risk because under traditional customary law, first 
movers’ initial actions, not untried articulations, become the focal 
point for subsequent movers’ actions. Thus, a customary norm only 
evolves where the observed practice reveals to participating states 
what is expected of them in the future, and consequently, 
coordination problems are minimal. When coordination problems 
are present, articulation processes may not effectively expedite the 
process of custom formation. 
Clearly, the respective advantages and limits of the alternative 
regimes in different environments have important policy 
implications for the design of optimal customary law formation 
mechanisms. While this article focuses principally on the relative 
effectiveness of traditional and articulation methods for 
establishing customary law, further work on this subject should 
extend this analysis to persistent and subsequent objector doctrines 
and other principles that govern the formation of customary law. 
Notwithstanding the possibility of future analytical extensions 
regarding customary law formation, this article strongly suggests 
that articulated norms are much more likely to produce ideal 
outcomes and satisfy states’ participation constraints than 
traditional methods. 
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APPENDIX 
 
A1. Customary Law Formation 
 
A1.1 Social optimum 
 
In each period, a state can expend an effort level e  to generate 
some benefit for another state. The social net benefit from e  is 
SNB ae be= − +2 , where the marginal cost of effort MC ae= 2  is 
an increasing function of e , and the marginal benefit of effort 
MB b=  is assumed constant. In each period, the social optimal 
effort level eS  is given by e b aS = 2 .  
 
A1.2 Custom formation: bilateral case 
 
There are two states. In period 0, one state tackles the need to 
exert some effort to rescue the other state. If the state undertakes 
the rescue, it would bear cost ae2  while the other state would 
receive benefit be . Subsequently, the same two states are engaged 
in repeat interaction. After the initial time period 0, starting from 
period 1 to infinity, the states alternate roles. In each period, there 
is a probability π  that each of the states will be the beneficiary of 
other states’ activities, and there is a probability of 1− π  that each 
state will continue to be on the giving side. If the states follow 
socially desirable practices, subject to reciprocity, in each future 
period, then π πbe ae− −( )1 2 calculates the first state’s expected 
payoff. If the state has a discount rate r , where r > 0 , then the 
total discounted value of expected payoffs from future periods is:  
 
1
1
1
1
11
2 2
( )
( ( ) ) ( ( ) )+ − − = ⋅ − −=
∞∑ r be ae r be aett π π π π  
 
Since the choice of action is in the hands of the rescuer, not the 
rescued state, it is sufficient to consider the participation and 
incentives of the rescuer state. The following equation shows the 
problem facing the individual state with the rescuer responsibility 
in period 0 who may become either the rescued or rescuer in some 
future period:  
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))1((1max 22 aebe
r
aeP
e
ππ −−+−=  
 
The optimal effort level eC  is: 
 
e
b
a r
C = + −
π
π2 1( )  
 
Substituting the optimal effort value eC  into the objective of the 
state gives the following maximal payoff:  
 
)1(4
)(
22
π
π
−+=≡ rar
bePP CC  
 
A1.2.1. Participation constraint. In order for the state to 
willingly participate in the rescue venture, its participation 
constraint must be satisfied; that is, P kC ≥  must hold for some k . 
It can be readily verified that ∂ ∂P aC < 0 , 0>bPC ∂∂ , 
0<rPC ∂∂ , and 0>π∂∂ CP .25 
   
A1.2.2. Incentive problem. From the optimal effort level eC  
found in A1.2, the model suggests the following:  (i) If π = 0 , 
0=Ce ; and (ii) If π = 1, arbeC 2= . Further, the following 
comparative static results obtain:∂ ∂πeC > 0 ,∂ ∂e rC < 0, 
∂ ∂e aC < 0 , and ∂ ∂e bC > 0 .  
 
A1.3 Custom formation: multilateral case 
 
Here, the model considers the case in which the probability of 
being a participant in a rescue venture depends on the number of 
available states N  (where N ≥ 2 ). In this case there is a 1 N  
probability that the state will be the rescuer, and likewise there is a 
probability of 1 N  that the state will need assistance from other 
states. This means that there is a residual probability of 1 2− N  
that the state is just a bystander in each future period. The problem 
of the state then becomes: 
 
 
 
25 For more details, see Fon and Parisi (2002). 
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max ( ( ) )
e
P ae
r N
be ae= − + ⋅ − −2 21 1 1π π  
 
Note that N  plays a similar role to r  in the state’s optimization 
problem. Hence, similar to the comparative static results 
∂ ∂e rC < 0 and 0<rPC ∂∂  found previously, ∂ ∂e NC < 0  
and 0<NPC ∂∂  now hold.   
 
A1.3.1. Introducing uncertainty. The basic model can expand 
to include the possibility of uncertainty that is present in custom 
formation. Specifically, the problem assumes a probability β  
(where 0 1< <β ) that others will follow the practice undertaken by 
the state in question in the future. in this case, the private 
optimization problem is adjusted as follows: 
 
max ( ( ) ) /
e
P ae be ae r= − + − −2 21βπ π . 
 
Thus, since the probability β  plays a role similar to that of b  in the 
optimization problem, the comparative static results are also 
similar: ∂ ∂ βeC > 0  and ∂ ∂ βPC > 0  hold.  
 
A1.3.2. Introducing time lags in the formation and recognition 
of custom. Here, T  represents the number of periods after the 
initial action but before the practice consolidates into a binding 
custom with expected reciprocal benefits. From period T  onward, 
the states will act under a reciprocally binding rule of custom, such 
that one state may obtain the benefit of the rule or face the burdens 
of such rule, with probabilities π and (1 - π), respectively. In this 
case, the discounted present value of the future expected payoff is: 
 
1
1
1
1
10
2
2
1( )
( ( ) )
( ( ) )
( )+ − − =
− −
++=
∞
−∑ r be ae be aer rt Tt Tπ π π π  
 
Thus, the problem confronting either state becomes:  
 
max
( ( ) )
( )e T
ae
be ae
r r
− + − −+ −
2
2
1
1
1
π π
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Comparing the current problem with the basic bilateral problem 
formulated A.1.2, r  is replaced by r r T( )1 1+ − .  
 
As demonstrated in the basic model, 
∂
∂
e
r r
C
T( ( ) )1
01+ <− .  
 
Since ∂ ∂r r TT( )1 01+ >− , then ∂ ∂e TC < 0 . Similarly, 
∂ ∂P TC < 0  holds. 
 
A2. Customary Formation with Articulation 
 
A2.1 Custom formation with articulation: bilateral case 
 
This problem considers the customary law processes that rely 
on ex ante articulations. In period 0, the states choose a rule by 
means of articulation. In future periods, the states will benefit from 
the rule with probability π  and will be burdened with probability 
1− π . Assuming a discount rate, r , the state maximizes the 
discounted present value of the total expected payoff:  
 
max ~ ( ( ) )
e
P
r
be ae= − −1 1 2π π  
 
The optimal level of effort e A  is: 
 
 e
b
a
A = −
π
π2 1( )  
 
And the maximal payoff is: 
 
P P e
b
ar
A A≡ = −
~( )
( )
π
π
2 2
4 1
 
 
A2.1.1. Participation constraint. Similar to the traditional 
customary law case, the participation constraint kP A ≥  must hold 
in the articulation case. Comparative static results with respect to 
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the best payoff AP  are also similar: 0<∂∂ aP A , 0>∂∂ bP A , 
0<∂∂ rP A , and 0>∂∂ πAP .26 
 
A2.1.2. Incentive problem. From the optimal effort level under 
articulation e A : 0<∂∂ ae A , 0>∂∂ be A , 0=∂∂ re A , 
0>∂∂ πAe .     
 
A2.1.3. Private versus socially optimal articulation. Comparing 
the privately optimal effort and the socially optimal effort level:  
 
Privately optimal effort: e
b
a
A = −
π
π2 1( )   
 
Socially optimal effort: e b aS = 2  
 
This comparison shows that the two are equal only if the 
probability of being a beneficiary of the emerging rule is π = 12 . 
Also, note that as π → 1, e A → ∞ .   
 
A2.2 Comparison of custom formation with and without 
articulation  
 
This problem compares the participation constraint under 
articulation theories and the participation constraint under 
customary law theory: 
 
Articulation theories: P
b
ar
kA = − ≥
π
π
2 2
4 1( )
  
 
Customary law theory: P
b
ar r
kC = + − ≥
π
π
2 2
4 1( )
 
 
The denominator of P A  is smaller than the denominator of PC  
since the former has one less term than the latter. Hence P A  is 
larger than PC . This means that the participation constraint is more 
easily satisfied in the articulation case than in the traditional 
customary law case.  
 
 
26 See Fon and Parisi (2002) for the comparative static expressions. 
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This problem then compares the privately optimal effort that 
states would advocate under articulation theories with the privately 
optimal level of effort chosen under customary law theory:  
 
Articulation theories: e
b
a
A = −
π
π2 1( )  
 
Customary law theory: e
b
a r
C = + −
π
π2 1( )  
 
The denominator of e A  is smaller than the denominator of eC  
since 0>r . Hence e eA C>  holds. 
 
A2.3 Custom formation with articulation: multilateral case 
 
The basic articulation model extends to the case in which 
randomly drawn states, from a larger population with N  states, 
participate in customary practice. At each period, the probability of 
being an active participant depends on the number of states 
involved, 1 N . This is the probability that a state either will 
benefit from the customary rule or it will become burdened by the 
rule. The following equation represents a state’s private problem: 
 
max ~ ( ( ) )
e
P
r N
be ae= ⋅ − −1 1 1 2π π  
 
Since N  plays a similar role to r  in the state’s optimization 
problem, the comparative static results are qualitatively similar to 
re A ∂∂  and rP A ∂∂  from before. In other words, 0=∂∂ Ne A  
and 0<∂∂ NP A .   
 
A2.3.1. Uncertainty and articulation in custom formation. This 
problem considers the case in which there is uncertainty whether a 
binding rule of custom will evolve from the participant states’ 
initial efforts. In particular, it assumes that other states will follow 
the practice with a probability β  ( 0 1< <β ) in the future. The 
state’s problem thus becomes: 
 
max ~ ( ( ) )
e
P
r
be ae= − −1 1 2βπ π  
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Since the probability β  plays a role similar to that of b  in the 
private optimization problem, in that it amounts to a multiplier of 
the future benefits, the comparative static result for β  is also 
qualitatively similar to the comparative static result for b : 
0>∂∂ βAe  and 0>∂∂ βAP .   
 
A2.3.2. Time lags and custom formation through articulation. 
Here, T  represents the number of periods after the prior 
articulation consolidates into a binding custom and reciprocal 
benefits are expected. In this case, the private optimization problem 
becomes: 
 
max
( ( ) )
( )e T
be ae
r r
π π− −
+ −
1
1
2
1  
 
In comparing this problem with the basic articulation case without 
time lags formulated in A2.1, it is clear that r r T( )1 1+ −  can replace 
r . By adopting results from the basic model, the following hold: 
 
∂
∂
e
r r
A
T( ( ) )1
01+ =−    and   
∂
∂
P
r r
A
T( ( ) )1
01+ <−   
 
Thus, ∂ ∂r r TT( )1 01+ >−  when the chain rule, 0=∂∂ Te A  and 
0<∂∂ TP A , is used. Notably there is a difference between the 
comparative static result 0=∂∂ Te A  and that obtained for the 
case of traditional customary processes where 0<∂∂ TeC . 
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